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A CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES
PERSPECTIVE ON CONTRACT LAW
AND PRACTICE
GIRARDEAU A. SPANN*
The critical legal studies movement is often viewed as highly
theoretical, characterized by impenetrable scholarship that makes
frequent reference to the work of"famous dead Europeans." ' Indeed, the theoretical detachment of critical legal studies from
real-world concerns has led some to speculate that the methodologies of the movement are so abstract and stylized that they could
be used to deny the validity of distinctions that we commonly rely
upon in everyday life-even something as basic as the distinction
between up and down.2 Given the level of abstraction at which
most critical legal studies analysis occurs, one might wonder why
a critical legal studies perspective would be offered at a conference intended to focus on the ways in which theory can affect the
practice of contract law. Despite its theoretical nature, I suspect
that critical legal studies has both a mundane and a more significant message for the practical application of law.
The practical utility of critical legal studies can best be appredated by focusing on the function that critical legal studies has
served in the broader context of American jurisprudence. By doing to legal realism what realism did to nineteenth century formalism, the critical legal studies movement conveyed what I
believe to be its central insight-that, in addition to whatever application an argument may have to its intended object, arguments
can also be applied to themselves. Once recognized, this insight
permitted the manipulation of doctrinal rules, through a process
frequently referred to as "deconstruction," to produce virtually
any result that the manipulator desired. It is through our efforts
Copyright © 1988, Girardeau A. Spann.
*Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. I wish to thank
Anita Allen, Richard Chused, Jay Feinman, Steve Goldberg, Alan Hyde, Judith
Kaye, Peter Menell, Elizabeth Patterson, Mike Seidman, Mark Tushnet, and Bill
Vukowich for their help in developing the ideas expressed in this article.
1. The phrase has been borrowed from readings prepared by Professor
James Boyle for the Eighth National Conference on Critical Legal Studies at 7
(March 16-18, 1984).
2. See Shapiro, The Death of the Up-Down Distinction, 36 Stan. L Rev.
465 (1984).
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to deal with the unsettling indeterminacy revealed by the phenomenon of deconstruction that the practical contributions of the

critical legal studies movement are likely to emerge.
Part I of this essay traces the development of the critical legal

studies movement in American jurisprudence, placing it on a continuum with formalism and legal realism. Part I then discusses

the indeterminacy thesis of critical legal studies, which I believe to
be its most significant contribution to legal scholarship. Part II
applies the indeterminacy thesis to a variety of contract doctrines
in order to impart both a technical understanding of the manner

in which deconstruction works, and a sense of the doctrinal disillusionment that it often generates. Finally, Part III discusses the

practical implications that theoretical indeterminacy may have for
the lawyers and judges who must apply the doctrines of contract
law. Although I am not myself a card-carrying member of the
critical legal studies movement, I am sufficiently sympathetic to

the indeterminacy
thesis to present it with the requisite degree of
3
enthusiasm.
I
THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT
Like most intellectual movements, the critical legal studies

movement was a response to that which preceded it.4 As the rigid
3. A substantial component of popular critical legal studies is its radical left
political agenda. The movement's assaults on liberalism, the reproduction of
hierarchy, and legal hegemony, in favor of communitarianism, egalitarianism,
and freedom from the illusion of false necessity undoubtedly account for the
appeal of critical legal studies to many of its adherents. Because I am not sufficiently sympathetic to the claim that these political objectives follow from the
indeterminacy thesis to present that claim with the requisite degree of enthusiasm, I will limit my focus to the indeterminacy thesis itself. Moreover, I believe
that it is radical indeterminacy, rather than radical politics, that gives critical
legal studies its status as a legitimate intellectual movement.
4. For a more elaborate account of the relevant intellectual history of American jurisprudence than is offered here, see G. White, Tort Law in America: An
IntellectualHistory (1980); Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing,
96 Yale L.J. 943, 943-72 (1987); Boyle, The Politics of Reason, 133 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 685, 687-735 (1984); Feinman, Promissory Estoppel and Judicial Method,
97 Harv. L. Rev. 678, 710-12 (1984); Mensch, The History of Mainstream Legal
Thought, in The Politics of Law: A Progressive Critique 18-39 (D. Kairys ed. 1982);
Tushnet, Post Realist Legal Scholarship, 1980 Wis. L. Rev. 1383; Unger, The
Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 561 (1983); Note, 'Round
and 'Round the Bramble Bush: From Legal Realism to Critical Legal Scholarship, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1669 (1982); see also A Discussion on Critical Legal Studies at the Harvard Law School (1985)(transcript of panel discussion sponsored
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categorical analyses of nineteenth century formalism grew to appear artificial and intellectually unsatisfying, the legal realists began to challenge the legitimacy of categorical analysis itself. They
suggested that more satisfying results would ensue from a process
of policy analysis, which could be implemented through the technique of interests balancing. Policy analysis was better suited
than formalism to the progressive resolution of social problems
because it was pragmatic and instrumental rather than pristine
and conceptual, the way that formalism had been.
As the legal realism of the 1920's and '30's grew to appear
artificial and intellectually unsatisfying, the critical legal studies
movement of the 1970's and '80's began to challenge the legitimacy of policy analysis itself. Critical legal studies adherents embraced the rule skepticism evolved by the realists in debunking
the conceptual categories of formalism, but they directed that
skepticism at both the social science principles that the realists
had offered as a substitute for the formalist categories and the
structural mechanisms that the realists had established to implement their progressive social program.
In the process of doing this, the critical legal studies movement appropriated the technique of deconstruction that was being used by continental philosophers and literary scholars to
revolutionize textual analysis, and used it to develop a thesis of
radical legal indeterminacy. This thesis asserts that all efforts to
provide a principled account of judicial behavior (or anything
else, for that matter) are vulnerable to the techniques of deconstruction, or "trashing" as it has affectionately come to be know
among its practitioners. A corollary of this thesis is that all judicial efforts at principled decision-making are necessarily doomed
to failure. It is the nihilist implications of the indeterminacy thesis that has caused the critical legal studies movement to be such a
controversial one. 5
by The Federalist Society); cf. M. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Lau,
1780-1860 (1977). The present historical account is derived from these sources.

5. I am not overlooking the fact that critical legal studies is frequently assodated with contemporary versions of Marxism. Although this association has
undoubtedly contributed to the controversy surrounding the movement, I suspect that it is the nihilist prodivities of certain adherents that has generated
most of the alarmist opposition. My guess is that Dean Carrington, for example,
would be relieved to learn that members of the critical legal studies movement
were merely Marxists. See Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34J. Legal Educ.
222, 227 (1984)(suggesting that members of the critical legal studies movement
should leave legal academics); see also Martin, "Of Law and the River," and Of
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A. Development of the Movement
Nineteenth century American legal thought was characterized by what is now referred to as formalism. Legal formalism
emerged during a period in which the American intellectual community was beginning to favor scientific over theological accounts
of perceived phenomena. Consistent with this preference, legal
formalism conceived of law as a science, and assumed that, like
other sciences, law could be understood by discovering its governing principles through a process of logical induction. Just as
physicists could induce the principles of gravity by generalizing
from the behavior that proximate masses exhibited under particular circumstances, lawyers could induce the principles of contract
law by generalizing from the behavior that courts exhibited in
particular cases. This view of law as a science manifested itself in
legal education as the case method, which was introduced at the
Harvard Law School in the 1870's by Dean Christopher Colum6
bus Langdell.
Inherent in the law-as-science perspective of formalism was
an inclination toward the analytical techniques of the scientific
method. Accordingly, the meaning of legal principles was discerned through a process of observing, organizing and classifying
the data provided by individual cases. The outcome of a case was
determined by how prior cases had been classified and by which
of the competing conceptual categories the facts of a case brought
it into. If an agreement fell into the "mutual assent" category, it
constituted a contract; otherwise it did not. If the motive of the
parties for entering into an otherwise acceptable contract fell into
the "consideration" category, the contract was enforceable;
otherwise it was not. In this sense, nineteenth century legal analysis was "formalistic." Relatively rigid conceptual categories,
rather than flexible standards of reasonableness or fairness, determined case outcomes, and proper classification was all that
mattered for proper resolution of legal disputes. 7
In the twentieth century, the scientific conceptualism of the
formalist approach began to lose much of its appeal. As case outcomes were perceived to change with changing social circumstances, belief in a transcendent set of legal principles became
more difficult to maintain. Moreover, the enhanced role that juNihilism and Academic Freedom, 35 J. Legal Educ. 1-26 (1984)(responses to
Dean Carrington's suggestion).
6. See G. White, supra note 4, at 20-37.
7. Cf. id. at 20-26.
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ries were permitted to play in resolving cases made it more difficult to argue that principles of legal science were the operative
forces behind legal decision-making. If such principles did exist,
the courts seemed to be ignoring them in order to reach more
equitable results. And to the extent that one approved of these
results, one was tempted to relinquish the view of legal principles
as scientific truths in favor of a view of legal principles as contingent, context-dependent assertions. 8
The legal realist movement of the 1920's and '30's crystallized growing dissatisfaction with the scientific view of legal principles. Legal realism grew out of an intellectual climate in which
pragmatic instrumentalism had replaced formal conceptualism as
the desired objective. American society was no longer conceived
of as an aggregation of autonomous individuals, but rather as an
amalgam of interdependent interest groups that had to find ways
to coexist. Accordingly, the emphasis in law shifted from proper
taxonomy to the development of promising strategies for dealing
with social problems. Social sciences such as sociology, anthropology, psychology, economics, and political science were consulted in the formulation of such strategies, and process-based
solutions to social problems were developed. American thinkers
also began to gravitate toward moral relativism and context-dependent views of values in lieu of the moral universalism that had
been offered by the formalists. 9
Legal realism was empirical and sociological where formalism had been theoretical and conceptual. As a result, the realists
favored innovative legislative solutions to social problems and
disfavored judicial invalidation of legislative initiatives in the
name of abstractions such as "property rights" or "freedom of
contract." Moreover, legal cases were regarded as sui generis
rather than as mere members of one formalist category or another. Although knowledge of general trends might provide
some assistance in resolving particular cases, at bottom case outcomes were a function of their individual facts. Accordingly, the
interface between legal doctrine and real-world effects, rather
than doctrinal integrity, was of paramount concern. Article Two
of the Uniform Commercial Code, drafted by the prominent legal
realist Karl Llewellyn, exemplifies this concern in its insistence
that the law of sales should correspond to sound commercial
practice, rather than forcing commercial practice to correspond
8. See id. at 56-62.
9. See id. at 63-75.
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to law. To the legal realists, law was an instrument for the implementation of social policy. As a result, the principles that mattered to the realists were not legal principles, but rather were the
social science principles that determined how legal doctrines actually played themselves out in society. 10
The fall of formalism not only caused a shift in emphasis
from legal to social science principles, it also introduced a new
type of legal analysis-interest balancing. Under the formalist regime, outcomes had been determined by categorizing cases-

either a case fell into one category or it fell into another; there
was no middle ground. Once the realists abandoned formalist
classifications, however, it was possible to blend and compromise
divergent interests in a way that was impossible under the mutually exclusive formalist categories. Moreover, interest balancing
responded to the new, sui generis conception of legal cases by permitting even subtle factual differences between cases to justify differential resolution of those cases. In a time of social volatility
and sociological experimentation, balancing provided a convenient mechanism for granting legal doctrine the flexibility needed
to keep pace with changing social developments. Balancing was
also consistent with emerging notions of political pluralism and
economic cost-benefit analysis-basic principles of two of the social sciences on which the realists had begun to rely. Balancing
was not only the hope for the future, but it ultimately became so
successful that even today it is difficult to analyze a legal problem
without lapsing into a reflexive interest balancing mode.I'
It was out of this context that the critical legal studies movement emerged in the late 1970's. Although the social programs
developed by the legal realists were less than completely successful, one of the analytical techniques developed by the realists
proved to be irresistibly seductive. The realists had prevailed in
their assault on formalism because they had been willing to peer
behind the facade of the formalist concepts, to question the unstated assumptions embedded in those concepts and to exploit
the internal inconsistencies that they found. This so-called rule
skepticism permitted the realists to nullify the appeal of the formalist categories. Disillusioned by the realists' failure to effectively implement their progressive political and social agendas,
critical legal studies adherents sought to complete the work that
10. See id. at 69-75. For an example of this flexible approach to dispute
resolution see U.C.C. § 1-102(2) & comment 1, and § 1-205 comment 1.
11. See Aleinikoff, supra note 4, at 955-63.
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the realists had begun. They chose to do this, however, by applying the rule skepticism that the realists had developed to the
foundations of the realist movement itself. Just as the realists had
peered behind formalist concepts in order to discredit them, critical legal studies adherents peered behind the social and governmental structures that the realists had established during the New
Deal, and behind the social science principles on which the realists had relied in formulating their social program. Just as the
realists had done, the critical legal theorists questioned the unstated assumptions embedded in those structures and principles,
12
and they exploited the internal inconsistencies that they found.
The political results were striking. Critical legal theorists argued forcefully that liberalism itself-belief in the primacy of individual liberty 1 3-was perpetuating economic inequality and social
injustice. Moreover, the concept of "rule of law" was suspect because it conceded minor victories to powerless individuals while
legitimating the basic economic and political assumptions of the
social system that caused those individuals to remain powerless.
The attainment of neutrality in principles of law or of social science was an impossibility, and the system was "tilted" so that outcomes would preserve existing power relationships and
reproduce existing illegitimate hierarchies. However, because the
"tilt" was not generally recognized, it could not effectively be opposed. The hegemony of the legal system had convinced those
without economic and political power that their plight was both
their own doing and a necessary consequence of fundamental
principles that they themselves held dear. As a result, the powerless were being held down by the illusion of false necessity.
Moreover, because the problems with both liberalism and the rule
of law are inherent in any liberal social system, the only way to
escape the inevitable repression of liberal legalism was through
localized communitarianism, known as "left decentralization,"
where shared values would preclude the need to use rhetorical
principles as a technique for social control. Although the bulk of
critical legal studies adherents are probably disgruntled liberal
democrats who endorse only diluted versions of this account,
some adherents are vocal neo-Marxists, for whom the present ac12. See Boyle, supra note 4, at 687-708; Tushnet, supra note 4, at 1384-88.

13. Other definitions of liberalism are possible. For example, Dworkin has
defined liberalism as giving primacy to a particular version of the principle of
equality. See R. Dworkin, A Matter of Principle 181-213 (1985). The concept of
equality, however, has itself been characterized as vacuous. See Westin, The
Empty Idea of Equality, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 537 (1982).
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4
count is undoubtedly too timid.'
The intellectual implications of the critical legal studies
movement were even more striking. Most critical legal studies adherents have been content to apply realist techniques to our basic
social and political structures, in the hope of advancing their
political agendas. However, the rule skepticism of the realists can
theoretically be transferred to any principle of any sort. There is
a wing of the critical legal studies movement, often referred to as
the irrationalist or nihilist wing, that is comprised of scholars who
are prepared to take the realist analytical insights as far as they
will go. They have developed a thesis of radical indeterminacy
that is both breathtaking in its scope and potentially unsettling in
its implications.' 5

B.

Indeterminacy

The indeterminacy thesis of critical legal studies asserts that
all principled accounts of perceived phenomena are demonstrably
inadequate. In fact, the principles themselves lack logical coherence. Note that the thesis does not address the question of what
sorts of accounts would be sufficient to explain social phenomena;
it simply highlights the inadequacies of accounts that are offered
by others. As a result, the indeterminacy thesis cannot itself constitute an argument in favor of any political objective-not even
the political objectives espoused by supporters of the critical legal
studies movement. Indeterminacy is politically neutral.1 6 Nevertheless, the indeterminacy thesis may facilitate realization of alternate political visions to the extent that it proves to be successful
in discrediting the political assumptions that underlie the status
quo. 17
The demonstration of inadequacy on which the indeterminacy thesis depends is accomplished through a process of
"deconstruction." Although there are both more and less techni14. For a sampling of critical legal studies literature see The Politics of Law:
A Progressive Critique (D. Kairys ed.)(1982); Critical Legal Studies Symposium, 36
Stan. L. Rev. 1 (1984).
15. Cf. Boyle, supra note 4, at 687-736.
16. I realize the difficulties inherent in this assertion.
17. In his comment on the present paper, Professor Feinman argues that an
appreciation of doctrinal indeterminacy permits decision-makers to transcend
the artificiality of doctrinal decision-making through explicit consideration of
the political and cultural factors that doctrine tends to obscure, thereby providing affirmative guidance for the proper resolution of cases rather than merely a
mechanism for criticizing them. Feinman, A Case Study in Critical Contract
Law, 1988 Ann. Surv. Am. L. 273.
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cal variants of the deconstruction technique, all variants incorporate some version of the same basic strategy. They all undermine
an argument by turning the argument against itself in a way that
exposes internal inconsistencies, and thereby neutralizes the argument's logical appeal. In this sense, deconstruction constitutes
the maturation of realist rule skepticism. I should emphasize
what deconstruction is and what it is not. Deconstruction is a
comment on the operation of language, logic and rational analysis. It is not a comment on the nature of the universe. Nevertheless, because deconstructive techniques can be applied to any
rational argument-including the arguments offered by deconstructionists themselves-many find deconstruction and radical
indeterminacy to be unsettling, threatening and disturbingly
nihilistic.
The critical legal studies movement borrowed the technique
of deconstruction from continental philosophers and literary
scholars. Although much of the writing about deconstruction has
come from literature departments, especially at Yale, the principle architect of the technique is Jacques Derrida, a French philosopher whose work has concentrated on methods of textual
analysis. Derrida's work is itself difficult to understand. However, Professor Balkin has provided an accessible description of
those aspects of Derrida's theories that are most often discussed
by legal commentators.' 8 Balkin identifies two deconstructive
techniques that are of use in the legal context. They are the inversion of hierarchies and the establishment of textual free play.' 9
Rather than describe these techniques at the outset, I will first
attempt to distill from them an administrable formula for doing
deconstruction, and then elaborate on the techniques more fully
as I illustrate their application.
The objective of deconstructing an argument is to demonstrate its lack of coherence-to establish that the principle on
which the argument rests does not actually generate the outcome
that the argument attributes to it, or any other outcome, because
it is not logically capable of doing so. An argument or principle
18. See Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 96 Yale U. 743
(1987). The present discussion of deconstruction is derived from Balkin's description. For a less technical discussion see Spann, Deconstructing the Legislative Veto, 68 Minn. L. Rev. 473, 516-43 (1984). For a more technical
description of Derrida's work see J. Culler, On Deconsilruion (1982). For those
who wish to deal with Derrida first hand, a relevant bibliography is supplied in
Balkin, supra, at 743 n.l.
19. See Balkin, supra note 18, at 746.
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can be deconstructed by following a three-step process. First,
specify an opposition or dichotomy that is inherent in the argument. This will be easy to do because the binary nature of logical
analysis-i.e. something either is the case or it is not-causes us
to incorporate dichotomous oppositions into our arguments.
Second, identify the hierarchical relationship implicit in the opposition that has been specified, grounding the hierarchy in its policy justifications. The implicit hierarchy will generally be quite
obvious, as will the policy reasons for establishing the hierarchical
relationship. Third, invert the hierarchy by pairing its favored
member with the disfavored justifications and the disfavored
member with the favored justifications. This part may require
some analytical dexterity, but the payoff will be big. Inversion of
the hierarchy will establish that the argument or principle on
which the argument rests is self-defeating, and for that reason,
cannot account for the phenomenon that it is offered to explain.
Where the argument at issue concerns proper interpretation of a
legal text, deconstruction of the argument will demonstrate that
the meaning of the text is indeterminate-equally susceptible to
all interpretations.
The nihilist potential of deconstruction becomes apparent
when one focuses on the claim that any argument offered to provide an account of any rational phenomenon is demonstrably inadequate. If true, there can be no principled explanations for
judicial decisions, social behavior in general, or anything elseincluding the phenomenon of deconstruction itself. Nevertheless, that is precisely the claim that the indeterminacy thesis
makes. Before confronting the nihilist implications of radical indeterminacy, however, it makes sense to ascertain whether the
deconstruction technique is really all that it claims to be. The
best way to formulate an opinion about the legitimacy and significance of indeterminacy-to become intimately acquainted with
the phenomenon-is to generate some indeterminacy yourself, so
that you can know what it feels like. Although deconstruction
may be difficult to understand in the abstract, it is relatively easy
20
to comprehend in operation.
20. Professor Dalton has exhaustively deconstructed a variety of contract
doctrines based upon the doctrinal difficulties initially illuminated by Kessler
and Gilmore. See Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine,
94 Yale LJ. 997, 1004 (1985) (citing F. Kessler & G. Gilmore, Contracts: Cases and
Materials (2d ed. 1970)(lst ed. 1953). Although the deconstruction formula that
I offer differs in detail from the methods employed in those earlier works, there
is no real difference in the substance of what is being done. This is true even
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II
DECONSTRUCTING THE STORY OF
CONTRACT LAW
In order to convey a feel for the manner in which deconstruction operates-and a concomitant appreciation for what it means
to say that doctrine is indeterminate-I would like to tell what I
believe to be the "story" of classical contract law, and then to
deconstruct each chapter of that story. A contract is an agreement
that manifests the intent of the contracting parties to deal with particular contingencies in particular ways. If the contract is freely
entered into by the parties as a result of their own volition, the
legal system will enforce the contract against a breaching party,
typically by awarding a damage remedy calculated to preserve the
contractual expectation of the non-breaching party. Legal enforcement, however, is limited to only those contracts that are supported by consideration. The emphasized terms are the chapter
tides of this story, each of which embodies a principle that can be
deconstructed. The classical story does not include chapters on
promissory estoppel or restitution, but as will become apparent,
those doctrines have very much become a part of the story.
A. Agreement
A contract is an agreement-something to which the parties
mutually assent. The legal system requires mutual assent as a
precondition to enforcement because contractual obligations are,
by definition, consensual. While the legal system endeavors to
facilitate private ordering among contracting parties, it has no interest in imposing its will on private actors, or in assisting one
private actor to impose his or her will on another private actor in
a unilateral manner. Accordingly, a contractual obligation is enforceable only to the extent that it results from a meeting of the
minds of the contracting parties.2 1 This mutual assent principle
can be deconstructed by: (1) specifying an opposition inherent in
the principle; (2) identifying the hierarchy implicit in that opposition, with its policy justifications; and (3) inverting the hierarchy.
(1) The argument that mutual assent should be required for
enforcement of a contract rests upon an opposition between
agreement and non-agreement. (2) The hierarchical relationship
between the two that is implicit in the mutual assent principle fathough the work of Kessler and Gilmore predated both the critical legal studies
movement and the term "deconstruction."
21. See E.A. Farnsworth, Contracts 106 (1982).
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vors agreement. The reason that agreement occupies the privileged position in the hierarchy is that it corresponds to the
consensual nature of contractual obligations. Non-agreement is
disfavored because it embodies coercion and interference with
private autonomy. If a court were to enforce an apparent contract
that did not genuinely embody a meeting of the minds, it would
be aligning itself with the coercive, disfavored member of the
hierarchy.
(3) In reflecting upon the manner in which contractual obligations are actually enforced, it becomes apparent that the disfavored characteristics associated with non-agreement actually
accompany what courts typically consider to be agreement, and
the favored characteristics of agreement actually accompany what
courts typically consider to be non-agreement. Contract disputes
arise because parties disagree over the effect that a particular contingency is to be given under their contract. If the parties disagree, however, there is no mutual assent-no contract-with
respect to that contingency. As a result, enforcement of the putative agreement constitutes coercive judicial interference with the
autonomy of the promisor in derogation of the consensual nature
of contractual obligation. Moreover, because apparent agreement simply masks what is in reality the absence of mutual assent,
the proper way for a court to implement the consensual limitation
on contractual obligation is to deny enforcement to putative contractual agreements. The original hierarchy has now been inverted, and the principle of mutual assent has been
deconstructed. 2 2 The principle not only fails to account for the
manner in which courts determine whether
a contract exists, but
23
it also fails to have any coherent content.
22. More fundamentally, all contract enforcement involves disfavored coercion because all contract enforcement entails judicial compulsion of an act that
the compelled actor will not take voluntarily. As a result, freedom from the coercion associated with non-agreement could occur only in the absence of any
state apparatus for contract enforcement. But the absence of such enforcement
apparatus would in turn defeat the possibility of ever achieving the consensual
objectives of contract law, because it would deprive the parties of the ability to
bind themselves to any future action. This dilemma illustrates that the technique of deconstruction can be used to invert and re-invert a hierarchy ad
nauseam, because a deconstructed argument is itself subject to deconstruction.
23. It is, of course, possible that the parties really did reach agreement with
respect to the troublesome contingency and that one of the parties is simply
pretending that no agreement was reached. If that is the case, however, the
dispute is not a true contracts dispute. Rather it is a tort case, involving fraud on
the part of one of the parties, with which classical contract law has no reason to
concern itself.
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Inversion of a hierarchy is accomplished by attributing the
characteristics initially associated with one member of a hierarchy
to the other member of that hierarchy. The successful inversion
of a hierarchy implies a necessary connection between the favored
and disfavored members themselves. Derrida refers to this connection as "dangerous supplementation." In order to fully understand the concept of agreement, for example, it is necessary to
think about what that concept entails in relation to what it does
not entail. Stated differently, it is not really possible to know what
agreement means without comparing it to non-agreement. In this
sense, non-agreement "supplements" the concept of agreement
by enhancing its meaning; the concept of agreement is incomplete in the absence of linkage to the concept of non-agreement.
However, non-agreement has negative connotations that caused
it to be the disfavored member of the original hierarchy. As a
result, non-agreement is a "dangerous" supplement to the concept of agreement. It threatens the concept with the very disfavored qualities that the concept was invoked in order to avoid.
But because the concept of agreement is incomplete without the
participation of its dangerous supplement, the desirable qualities
of agreement cannot be attained without also being "enhanced"
by the disfavored qualities of the supplement. It is because of this
interdependence between a principle and its dangerous supplement that a hierarchical relationship between the two can be in24
verted, thereby permitting the principle to be deconstructed.
B.

Intent

A contract embodies the intent of the parties concerning the
effect that particular contingencies should have on their respective rights and duties. As a result, a court called upon to enforce
a contract should interpret that contract in accordance with the
intent of the parties. If a court were to enforce a contract in a
manner that was not prescribed by the parties, it would again interfere with the autonomy of the parties and undermine the consensual basis of contractual obligation, just as if it had forced a
party to act in the absence of mutual assent. However, because a
court can never read the mind of a contracting party in order to
discover his or her subjective intent, the intent of the parties must
be ascertained by drawing inferences from the parties' behavior24. For additional discussion of the concept of "dangerous supplementation," see Balkin, supra note 18, at 758-64; Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy
in American Law, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 1276, 1288-92 (1984).
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the outward manifestations of their intent. This approach to contract interpretation is known as the objective theory of contracts. 2 5 Like the mutual assent principle, the intent principle can
be deconstructed by inverting its implicit hierarchy.
The argument that a contract should be interpreted in a manner that is consistent with the intent of the parties rests on an
opposition between intended and unintended contractual consequences. The hierarchy implicit in that opposition favors intended consequences because, once again, judicial enforcement
of intended consequences is consistent with the consensual basis
of contractual obligation, while judicial imposition of unintended
consequences would entail coercive interference with private
autonomy.
However, a court seeking to implement the intent of the parties can respond only to the outward manifestations of the parties'
intent-typically, the language contained in a written document.
And, by definition, a manifestation of intent is different from intent itself; it is a mere symbolic representation of the parties' actual intent. Indeed, the very reason that the law of contracts was
forced to evolve the objective theory was to justify enforcement of
manifestations rather than actual intent. As a result, when a court
enforces a contract, it is enforcing something other than the intent of the parties-it is typically enforcing only the words on a
piece of paper. Judicial enforcement of a contract, therefore, actually frustrates the intent principle and once again undermines
the consensual basis of contractual obligation. It is by declining
to enforce supposed contractual obligations that courts can best
adhere to the intent principle and avoid coercive interference
with individual autonomy. The hierarchy has again been inverted
26
and the intent principle has been deconstructed.
The technique used to deconstruct the intent principle in the
contracts context is also useful in other legal contexts. A contract
is a text to be interpreted in accordance with the intent of its authors. Similarly, statutes, constitutional provisions and common
law precedents are also texts whose interpretations are typically
to be determined by authorial intent. Just as a contract is necessarily distinct from the intent of the parties, however, other legal
25. See E.A. Farnsworth, supra note 21, at 113-16.
26. This deconstruction is similar to the technique used by Derrida in his
now-famous deconstruction of the opposition between language and speech,
which is described in Balkin, supra note 18, at 755-58. The particular manipulation that Derrida employed has now become a staple of deconstruction technology. See, e.g., Dalton, supra note 20, at 1039-66.
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texts are necessarily distinct from the intents of their drafters.
This assertion acquires considerable intuitive appeal in the context of a constitutional provision like the equal protection clause
or the due process clause. The meaning of those clauses has
changed considerably over time, even though the intent of the
authors has remained constant.
The deconstructive process of divorcing a text from the intent of its author is known as establishing the "free play" of the
text. Because a text is qualitatively distinct from the intent of its
author, it has the capacity to convey meanings that are different
from the author's intent. Derrida calls this capacity "iterability"-the text can be reiterated in many different contexts, all
of which are likely to alter the way in which it is interpreted. The
author may have an interpretation, but it is only one of many in-

terpretations. Because the author's interpretation cannot correspond to-achieve identity with-the author's intent, it cannot
claim to be a privileged interpretation.
The phenomenon of free play establishes that the proper interpretation of a text is indeterminate. The author's interpretation does not control the meaning of a text, and there is no other
basis to ascertain an authoritative meaning. Rather, the meanings
of a text will be intersubjective. The author's subjective intent
will be transformed into a text that will itself be transformed into
the reader's subjective interpretation. Although intersubjective
communication might be desirable in some areas, the legal system
would not seem to be one of them. Because textual indeterminacy denies to legal texts the capacity to acquire the authoritative
meanings that they need in order to achieve independence from
mere interpretations of those texts, the 2free
play of text is devas7
tating to the concept of the rule of law.
C. Volition
In order for a contract to be legally enforceable, it must have
been freely entered into by the parties. If the contract did not
result from the parties' own volition, enforcement would again be
inconsistent with the consensual basis of contractual obligation.
Contract law has developed a variety of bargaining defect doctrines designed to implement the volition principle. Doctrines
such as capacity, undue influence, duress and unconscionability
27. For a more thorough explication of textual free play and its relationship
to indeterminacy and rule of law, see Balkin, supra note 18, at 772-85.
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28
deny enforcement if the free will of a party has been overborne.
In addition, doctrines relating to mistake, impossibility, impracticability and frustration deny enforcement if the will of the parties,
although freely exercised, has been motivated by an erroneous
assumption concerning the circumstances surrounding the contract that is serious enough to preclude actual allocation of the
pertinent risks.2 9 Collectively, the bargaining defect doctrines effectuate the fundamental policy of freedom of contract by binding
parties to only those agreements that result from a bargaining
process reliable enough to ensure true volition.
The volition principle rests on an opposition between process-based and substantive justifications for judicial enforcement
decisions. A court will decline to enforce a contract if the court
disapproves of the bargaining process that produced the contract.
If the bargaining process was a reliable one, however, the court
will not refuse enforcement merely because it disapproves of the
substantive bargain struck by the parties. The hierarchy implicit
in this opposition favors process-based justifications and disfavors
substantive justifications for non-enforcement. Process-based
justifications advance the consensual objectives of contract law by
ensuring meaningful mutual assent, but non-enforcement based
on substantive disapproval of the contract terms would constitute
judicial negation of the parties' intent, in violation of the policy of
freedom of contract.
The process/substance hierarchy can be inverted by focusing
on the manner in which a court must determine whether a particular contract does or does not result from a defective bargaining
process. Just as a court cannot read the minds of the parties in
order to ascertain their actual intent, it cannot examine the will of
a contracting party in order to determine whether that will was
exercised freely in forming a particular bargain. The only way
that a court can make the necessary volition determination is by
drawing inferences from the bargaining context or from the terms
of the bargain itself. If the court bases its volition determination
on the terms of the bargain itself, it is substituting its judgment
about the substantive wisdom of the contract for the judgment of
the parties, in derogation of the policy of freedom of contract.
However, even if a court bases its volition determination on the
circumstances that surrounded the bargaining process, it will still
be substituting its judgment for that of the parties. It will be as-

28. See E.A. Farnsworth, supra note 21, at 232-34.
29. See id. at 647-49.
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suming that the parties judged the wisdom of entering into a contract under those circumstances in the same way that the court
would have made such a judgment. However, the whole point of
relying on process rather than substantive justifications in making
judicial enforcement decisions is to preclude judicial second
guessing of the parties'judgments, because such second guessing
undermines the volition principle and the fundamental policy of
freedom of contract. Stated more succinctly, the volition principle-freedom of contract-is intended to ensure that parties have
the freedom to insist on their own idiosyncracies. But processbased justifications for judicial nonenforcement deny them this
freedom by subjecting them to the idiosyncracies of the court.
Accordingly, process-based justifications subvert the volition
principle and undermine freedom of contract.
Ironically, substantive justifications for non-enforcement are
more likely than process-based justifications to advance the volition principle inherent in freedom of contract concerns. The volition principle enables parties to make whatever contractual
arrangements they believe will best serve their own interests.
Although a court cannot examine the will of a contracting party in
order to ascertain the freedom with which that will is exercised, a
court can evaluate the terms of the contract resulting from the
exercise of that will in order to determine how the best interests
of the parties are affected. Moreover, this best interest determination will be more effective if made through direct scrutiny of
the substantive terms of the bargain than through the circuitous
route of analyzing the process by which the bargain was struck.
Indeed, it is for this very reason that the drafters of the Uniform
Commercial Code chose to include an unconscionability provision permitting courts to police bargains directly rather than requiring them to go through the charade of a process-based
analysis.3 0 Admittedly, direct substantive policing of a contractual bargain will cause some judicial interference with the volition
of contracting parties. However, as a utilitarian matter-because
most people have normal rather than idiosyncratic desires-substantive judicial enforcement decisions will maximize realization
of the best interests of contracting parties in general.
Process-based justifications for judicial refusals to enforce
contracts undermine the volition principle and frustrate freedom
of contract. Substantive justifications for such refusals, however,
maximize fidelity to the volition principle, by maximizing the
30. See U.C.C. § 2-302 comment 1.
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best-interest objectives that underlie that principle. The process/substance hierarchy has now been inverted and the volition
principle has been deconstructed.
Deconstruction of the volition principle provides an example
of the manner in which critical legal theory can defeat a realist
claim by applying the techniques of realism to the tenets of realism itself. The tension between freedom of contract and judicial
intervention in the guise of contract interpretation was well recognized by the legal realists. In fact, it was the centerpiece of the
realist challenge to formalism in contract law. 3 ' One of the things
that the realists did to escape formalist legal categories was to offer process-oriented approaches to legal analysis.8 2 But by reformulating realist skepticism about freedom of contract as a more
generalized challenge to the distinction between process and substance, critical legal theory is able to do to legal realism what legal
realism did to formalism.
The technique used to deconstruct the process/substance hierarchy could also be used to deconstruct the hierarchies implicit
in other general oppositions, such as the oppositions between
form and substance, subjectivity and objectivity, public and private, or the individual and society.83 In fact, deconstruction of
these oppositions is common in the critical legal studies literature.3 4 Because they are basic components of most analytical distinctions, almost any argument or principle can be said to rest on
one or another of these oppositions, and can then be deconstructed by inverting their implicit hierarchies. That is what enables critical legal studies to extrapolate from the relatively
modest claims made by most legal realists to the more expansive
claims made by the nihilist wing of the critical legal studies
movement.
D.

Expectation

The typical remedy for breach of contract is expectation
damages-a monetary award measured by the cost of approximat31. See, e.g., G. Gilmore, The Death of Contract 35-53 (1974); F. Kessler & G.
Gilmore, supra note 20, at 686-741.
32. Cf. G. White, supra note 4, at 110-13 (discussing the process legacy of
realists in the context of tort law).
33. The individual/society hierarchy is discussed more fully in Part III(A)
below.
34. See, e.g., Dalton, supra note 20; Feinman, supra note 4; Frug, supra
note 24; Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 Harv. L.
Rev. 1685 (1976).
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ing performance for the non-breaching party. Although sensible

arguments can be made for measuring damages by the amount
necessary to compensate for the non-breaching party's frustrated
reliance, or to prevent unjust enrichment, modem contract law
uses lost expectation as the typical measure of damages in the

apparent belief that the essence of a contract is the expectation

that it embodies.3 5 Although it is difficult to account for precisely

why contract law favors the protection of lost expectations, Fuller
and Perdue have offered what has become the prevailing doctri-

nal view. The reliance interest includes opportunity costs-costs
associated with all the other contracts that were not made as a
consequence of the one contract that was made. However, because opportunity costs can be difficult to measure, the legal system can best protect the aspect of reliance to which they
correspond by deferring to the parties' own estimate of their
value. The contract expectation constitutes that estimate because
it represents the value for which the parties were willing to exchange their opportunity costs. Accordingly, the reason that contract law protects the expectation interest is really to protect the
36
reliance interest.
Fuller and Perdue have provided a basis for deconstructing
the expectation principle. The principle rests on an opposition
between expectation and reliance in which expectation is given
the preferred hierarchical position because it corresponds to the
essence of a contract right. However, because expectation is only
valuable as a means of pursuing reliance, reliance actually occupies the preferred position in the hierarchy; expectation is disfavored because it constitutes a mere indirect approximation of the
reliance interest that we could better protect directly. The realists
had such insights available to them in developing their rule skepticism, and that skepticism caused them to seek refuge in process
guarantees and policy analysis. The vulnerability of the realists'
process approach to legal analysis has already been discussed.
However, the substantive social science policies that the realists
offered as a substitute for formal doctrinal analysis are also subject to deconstruction.
Perhaps the most popular social science enlisted for the purpose of engaging in contemporary policy analysis is economics.
The law and economics movement has now offered analytical ac35. See E.A. Farnsworth, supra note 21, at 811-16.
36. See Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages (pts. 1
& 2), 46 Yale LJ. 52, 373 (1936).
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counts for most of the legal doctrines that have present significance. The law and economics explanation for why contract law
protects the expectation interest, rather than the reliance or restitution interest, is that the expectation principle of contract damages best promotes efficient breaches. If the value of a breach to
the breaching party is high enough to benefit the breaching party
even though he or she will have to compensate the non-breaching
party for that party's lost expectation, the law should provide an
incentive to breach. A breach will promote efficiency, because the
non-breaching party will be no worse off than he or she would
have been after performance and the breaching party will be better off. Moreover, the goods or services that constitute the subject matter of the contract will be directed to the user who values
them most highly. Neither reliance nor restitution damages can
ensure efficiency, because they provide incentives to breach even
when the non-breaching party may not be fully compensated for
37
the lost expectation.
Note that this justification holds true only to the extent that
contract doctrine is interested in regulating breach behavior. If
contract law were instead interested in regulating reliance behavior, restitution damages would be the preferable measure, because they provide the best efficiency incentives to a party
considering whether to make a particular reliance investment in a
contract. Expectation and reliance damages reimburse reliance
expenditures without regard to their efficiency. However, because restitution damages will not provide such reimbursement, a
given reliance investment will be made only if it appears to be
efficient-i.e. warranted in light of the probability of receiving the
38
performance that was bargained for.
Accordingly, to the extent that traditional contract doctrine
deems efficient breaches to be more important than efficient reliance, the expectation damage rule best promotes efficiency because it is the only one of the three alternatives capable of
ensuring that only efficient breaches are encouraged by the legal
system. As a corollary, expectation damages are generally preferable to compelled or coerced performance, because such compulsion would provide a disincentive to breach even when a breach
was efficient. For that reason, contract law generally makes the
injunctive remedy of specific performance unavailable, and it re37. See A. Polinsky, An Introduction to Law and Economics 25-32 (1983); cf. R.
Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 88-97 (1977). These efficiency determinations
assume that the parties are risk neutral. See A. Polinsky, supra, at 27.
38. See A. Polinsky, supra note 37, at 32-36.
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fuses to enforce penalty provisions that are included in a contract
in order to punish nonperformance.3 9
This efficiency principle can be deconstructed by focusing on
precisely what it is that makes a breach efficient. In order for a
breach to be efficient, the non-breaching party must be accurately
compensated. Undercompensation will defeat efficiency by leaving the non-breaching party with less than what was bargained
for, and overcompensation will defeat efficiency by deterring
some efficient breaches that would have occurred at the proper
level of compensation. Accordingly, the efficiency principle rests
on an opposition between accurate and inaccurate compensation-or, more precisely, between remedies that provide accurate
compensation and remedies that provide inaccurate compensation. The hierarchy implicit in this opposition favors accurate
remedies because they promote efficiency, and it disfavors inaccurate remedies because they undermine efficiency. Expectation
damages are favored because they constitute an accurate remedy.
All other remedies are disfavored because they constitute inaccurate remedies. Reliance and restitution damages are inaccurate
because they undercompensate the non-breaching party. Specific
performance and punitive damages are inaccurate because they
overcompensate the non-breaching party by enabling that party
to extort from the breaching party the more costly remedy of actual performance when expectation damages alone would suffice
to provide full compensation.
39. See R. Posner, supra note 37, at 93-94, 95-97. Things can get more
complicated if the relative risk aversions of the parties are taken into account.
See A. Polinsky, supra note 37, at 61-63.
Fairness to the law and economics movement requires recognition of more
recent economic analyses of contract remedies that consider complexities not
addressed by the stereotypical efficient-breach analysis. These more recent
analyses do not endorse the view that expectation damages are necessarily the
most efficient of the available remedies. See generally Clarkson, Miller & Mu-is,
Liquidated Damages v. Penalties: Sense or Nonsense, 1978 Wis. L. Rev. 351
(1978); Goetz & Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient
Breach, 77 Colum. L. Rev. 554 (1977); Katz, A Note on Optimal Contract Damages When Litigation is Costly (1987)(unpublished manuscript); Menell, Contract Formation and Damage Remedies for Breach of Contract
(1987)(unpublished manuscript); Schwartz, The Case for Specific Performance,
89 Yale LJ. 271 (1979).
Although more sophisticated economic analyses are possible, to date, the
stereotypical analysis is what has been assimilated into practical contract law.
The more sophisticated economic analyses are also susceptible to deconstruction by those with a more sophisticated understanding of economics.
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This hierarchy can be inverted by pairing favored expectation
damages with disfavored inaccuracy, and by pairing the disfavored remedies with the accuracy objectives of the efficiency principle. Expectation damages are inaccurate, and therefore
inefficient, because they constitute a less precise measure of the
injury suffered by the non-breaching party than all of the other
remedies. Damages provide an imperfect measure of compensation because they do not include the incidental costs of enforcement, such as attorneys' fees, and because they do not include
compensation for intangible injuries such as aggravation that are
very real but very difficult to value. As a result, the most accurate
monetary measure of the injury caused by a breach is whatever
penalty provision the parties agreed upon when forming their
contract. 40 This is the amount it would take to fully compensate
the non-breaching party-to make that party indifferent to the
choice of receiving performance or receiving damages. Although
one might argue that a penalty provision overstates the nonbreaching party's actual interest in receiving performance and
permits that party to recover a windfall, that argument merely ignores the true nature of the bargain. Even assuming that the penalty provision does include a windfall component, the windfall is
something for which the parties bargained, and for which the
non-breaching party had to make bargaining concessions to obtain. Accordingly, a mutually agreed upon penalty provision constitutes the most accurate monetary measure of the nonbreaching party's injury, and it is the measure that would best
41
promote efficiency.
Specific performance is also a more accurate remedy than an
expectation damage award. Although specific performance is not
quite as accurate as enforcement of a penalty provision because it
does not permit compensation for the costs and aggravation of
litigation, it is more accurate than expectation damages because it
permits the non-breaching party to benefit from those non-quantifiable, intangible components of the bargain that cannot realistically be included in an ordinary damage award. Although one
might again argue that specific performance amounts to a windfall
if the non-breaching party does not at the time of breach desire
actual performance, this again merely ignores one component of
40. The law can, of course, require parties to specify in their contracts the
remedy for breach as a prerequisite to judicial enforcement.
41. For economic analyses suggesting that enforcement of penalty provisions may promote efficiency see Clarkson, Miller & Muris, supra note 39; Goetz
& Scott, supra note 39.
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the bargain. At least under a regime in which specific performance was the recognized remedy for breach, the right to compel
performance would simply be one of the contract rights secured
by the non-breaching party during the bargaining process. Moreover, if the non-breaching party does not truly desire actual performance, he or she will sell that contract right to the breaching
party, thereby permitting the efficient outcome. The question of
whether the breaching party or the non-breaching party is "entitled" to the proceeds of that sale is simply a distributional
ques42
tion with which efficiency analysis has no concern.
Expectation damages are also a less accurate measure of
compensation than reliance damages. If Fuller and Perdue are
correct that expectation damages are attractive only because they
approximate the complete reliance injury occasioned by a breach,
including opportunity costs, a direct measure of reliance damages
themselves will provide a better measure of this loss. The court
can take direct testimony about market conditions and the likely
alternative behavior of the parties in order to ascertain opportunity costs and include them in the measure of reliance damages
that it awards. Although this may be both difficult and uncertain,
it is no more difficult or uncertain than the quantification of pain
and suffering or a lifetime of lost earnings, which courts engage in
everyday. The argument for measuring the full reliance loss
through reference to the contract expectation rests on the assumption that the parties are better able than the judicial system
to quantify elusive intangibles. Assuming that this is true, however, it constitutes an argument for judicial enforcement of the
penalty provisions that the parties provide in their contract, not
for awarding expectation damages. Penalty provisions, not expectation damages, provide the best measure of the lost expectation-which, under this theory, is relevant because it provides the
best measure of frustrated reliance. Either direct judicial determination of full reliance or deference to the parties in the form of
enforced penalty provisions would constitute a sensible approach
to measuring lost reliance. But, an expectation damage award
seems like nothing more than some compromise middle ground.
Finally, expectation damages are even less accurate a measure of full compensation than restitution damages. Assuming
that the ultimate objective of awarding expectation damages is to
42. This is an application of the Coase Theorem. See Coase, The Problem
of Social Costs, 3J. L. & Econ. 1 (1960). For an economic analysis suggesting
that specific performance can be efficient see Schwartz, supra note 39.
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protect the reliance interest of the non-breaching party, restitution damages can accomplish this in the most efficient way possible-by preventing inefficient reliance before it occurs. Although
expectation damages arguably promote efficient breach decisions,
it is restitution damages that best promote efficient reliance decisions. Accordingly, to the extent that the legal system is interested in simultaneously promoting efficiency and protecting
reliance, those dual objectives can best be secured by adopting a
damage rule that encourages reliance only under circumstances
in which reliance would be efficient-by awarding restitution
damages rather than expectation damages for breach of contract.
The efficiency principle has now been deconstructed by inverting the accuracy hierarchy of contract remedies. For the purposes of promoting efficiency, expectation damages constitute the
least, rather than the most, accurate remedy for breach of contract. As a result, expectation damages undermine rather than
promote the goal of efficiency. An unstated assumption lying beneath every efficiency analysis is the assumption that the remedy
used to compensate the non-breaching party will in fact provide
adequate compensation. However, because legal remedies can
never be fully compensatory, economic efficiency in fact entails a
sacrifice of some portion of the non-breaching party's full expectation. Because that makes the outcome inefficient, the concept
of efficiency becomes self-consuming. Moreover, because the interest of the non-breaching party is knowingly sacrificed in order
to promote additional economic activity, efficiency analysis is
neither neutral nor value free.
Efficiency economics is not the only type of substantive policy
analysis that is subject to deconstruction by emphasizing the implications of its unstated assumptions. Like the legal system itself, social science systems operate through the application of
logical rules to governing principles that are expressed in linguistic terms. Because of the ambiguities inherent in language and
the limitations that logical analysis entails, the principles of any
social science will be vulnerable to deconstruction by anyone who
is sufficiently familiar with the discipline to recognize and manipulate the unstated assumptions on which the discipline is based.
E.

Consideration

A contractual promise is legally enforceable only if it is supported by consideration. Under eighteenth century contract law,
consideration consisted of a benefit to the promisor or a detriment to the promisee, and contracts were enforced in order to
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avoid the unjust enrichment of the promisor or the reliance injury
to the promisee that would result from non-enforcement. Since
the nineteenth century, however, consideration has consisted of a
bargained-for exchange-an exchange in which the component
promises or performances of the contract induce each other. If
they do not induce each other, but rather result from other motives such as donative intent or moral obligation, the contract is
not enforceable, because it is not supported by consideration.
Although restitution or promissory estoppel recoveries may still
be available to prevent unjust enrichment or frustrated reliance,
those doctrines do not compel enforcement of the contract itself,
protect the
but merely provide whatever recovery is necessary to
43
respective interests with which they are concerned.

Two types of justifications are typically offered for the contemporary consideration requirement. First, restricting legal enforcement to bargained-for exchanges promotes the allocation of
limited societal enforcement resources to the types of promises
that are most likely to increase social utility. 44 Second, the act of
bargaining itself serves as a legal formality that promotes the benefits generally associated with formalities. Like the early common
law seal, it causes the parties to deliberate more carefully before
they enter into a contract, and it increases the likelihood that they
will provide evidence of their agreement in a form useful to a
court that may be called upon to enforce it.45 The contemporary
doctrine of consideration, therefore, advances both functional
and formal objectives.
The consideration principle rests on an opposition between
exchange and detriment. More specifically, it rests on an opposition between promises that are part of an exchange, which are
enforced in order to complete the exchange, and promises that
are not part of an exchange, whose only claim to enforcement lies
in the desire to prevent some sort of detriment-either frustrated
reliance or unjust enrichment. An example of an exchange promise is a standard bilateral contract to sell a widget for a specified
sum of money. Examples of detriment promises include a promise to make a gift, a promise to satisfy a moral obligation, and a
promise made in appreciation of some past consideration, where
non-enforcement would frustrate reliance or restitution interests.
43. See E.A. Farnsworth, supra note 21, at 41-42; Feinman, supra note 4, at
678-96.
44. See E.A. Farnsworth, supra note 21, at 47-48.
45. See Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 Colum. L. Rev. 799, 800-04
(1941).
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The hierarchy implicit in this opposition favors exchange
promises because exchanges promote social utility and serve the
objectives of legal formality. Detriment promises are disfavored
because they divert societal resources to the enforcement of nonproductive promises and they ignore the need for beneficial legal
formalities. The exchange/detriment hierarchy can be inverted
by focusing on the nature of the correlation that exists between
the type of promise at issue and the consequences attributed to
that type of promise. Exchange promises do not necessarily increase social utility because something as trifling as a "peppercorn" can suffice as bargained-for consideration. 4 6 If this means
that the doctrine of consideration is a purely formal doctrine, it
has nothing whatsoever to do with substantive social utility. If it
means that, for freedom of contract reasons, the court is unwilling to override the subjective valuations that the parties attach to
their exchange, the doctrine still fails to assure substantive utility
because the court is not empowered to ascertain whether a bargain in form also constitutes a bargain in substance. Moreover,
the degree to which consideration serves the deliberative and evidentiary functions associated with it as a legal formality is minimal
at best. A detriment promise made in a notarized writing is much
more likely to serve the functions of legal formality than a precipitous oral exchange. Nevertheless, the oral exchange is enforceable under the consideration rule while the detriment promise is
not. In Derrida's terms, the exchange/detriment hierarchy has
now been "ungrounded." 4 7 The members of the hierarchy have
been shown not to correlate with the consequences attributed to
them.
The hierarchy can be inverted by regrounding each member
in the consequence initially attributed to the opposite memberby showing that the correlation between category and consequence is, in fact, inverse. Rather than promoting social utility,
the allocation of societal resources to the enforcement of exchange promises undermines social utility by diverting societal
enforcement to promises that cannot increase utility. Pure exchange promises, by hypothesis, entail no detrimental reliance or
unjust enrichment. If they did, enforcement based upon promissory estoppel or restitution theories would preclude the need for
consideration-based enforcement. Because neither reliance nor
enrichment are implicated, refusal to enforce an exchange entails
46. See E.A. Farnsworth, supra note 21, at 66.
47. Cf. Balkin, supra note 18, at 755.
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no loss of utility. If you are tempted to argue that loss of the
expectation is itself a loss of utility, such an argument simply restates the problem encountered in trying tojustify an expectation
damage rule for contract recoveries-a problem that could ultimately be solved only by reformulating the expectation interest as
a device for the protection of detrimental reliance. Detriment
promises, on the other hand, do entail a loss of utility if they are
breached. Because reliance or enrichment interests are necessarily implicated in detriment promises, the breach thereof inflicts a
harm upon those interests which correspond to a loss of social
utility.
As a matter of legal formality, the act of investing reliance or
enrichment in a contract is more likely to serve the deliberative
and evidentiary functions of the legal system than the act of bargaining where no reliance or enrichment is involved. Because
there is a potential for out-of-pocket loss in the context of a detriment contract, which does not exist with respect to an exchange
contract, the incentive to take precautions is greater when entering into a detriment contract. The exchange/detriment hierarchy
has now been inverted and the consideration principle has been
deconstructed.
It is easy to deconstruct the consideration principle because
no one has yet been able to fashion a persuasive justification for
it. Economists have no use for the doctrine because it does nothing to promote efficiency. 48 Those who believe in legal formalities are quick to admit that detrimental reliance would better
serve the function of formality. 49 And for those who believe that
there is a moral obligation to honor promises, consideration is an
irrelevant vestige of less enlightened reasoning. 50 Nevertheless,
we continue-at least nominally-to require the presence of consideration before we will enforce a contract. The significance of
the doctrine lies in the fact that we submit to it, knowing it serves
no useful purpose. Although it is completely non-instrumental,
we comply with the consideration requirement simply because it
is a rule with which we must comply. So characterized, the con48. For a suggestion that enforcement of gratuitous promises not supported by consideration can be efficient, and a discussion of exceptions and
modifications that are necessary to make the doctrine of consideration efficient
see Posner, Gratuitous Promises in Economics and Law, 6J. Legal Stud. 411
(1977).
49. Cf. Fuller, supra note 45, at 817.
50. See C. Fried, Contract as Promise: A Theory of Contractual Obligation 14-17
(1981).
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sideration requirement appears Kafka-esque. Moreover, to the
extent that deconstruction "works," it suggests that all legal doctrines, like the doctrine of consideration, are incapable of satisfactory justification. If principled accounts are unavailable, if things
are radically indeterminate, troublesome questions arise concerning rule-of-law itself, leading one to recall Grant Gilmore's
admonition:
The better the society, the less law there will be. In Heaven
there will be no law, and the lion will lie down with the lamb.
The values of an unjust society will reflect themselves in an
unjust law. The worse the society, the more law there will be.
In Hell there will be nothing but law, and due process will be
51
meticulously observed.
However, Gilmore's admonition may provide a way of dealing with the disturbing implications of radical indeterminacy, and
even the nihilism that it portends.
III
PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
The foregoing deconstructions demonstrate that critical legal
studies operates at a fairly high level of abstraction. Nevertheless,
I believe that the critical legal studies movement does have two
concrete implications for the practice of law. The first is relatively
uneventful: critical legal studies techniques are, in fact, what constitute the practice of law. As a result, one can become a better
judge or practitioner by mastering those techniques. The second
implication is more significant. By unmasking the fallacy of theoretical justification, critical legal insights permit the legal system
to produce what are actually better results. In light of its practical
utility, the critical legal studies movement has fittingly inverted
the hierarchy between theory and practice.
A.

Deconstruction as Practice

Under the doctrine of stare decisis, which characterizes our
common law method of decision making, the practice of law consists of inducing general principles from precedents and deducing
the outcome that those principles produce in specific fact situations. This process entails three analytical activities that correspond to the techniques used in deconstruction. First, intrinsic in
both the inductive and deductive aspects of legal practice is the
51. G. Gilmore, Ages of American Law 111 (1977).
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type of functional analysis on which the deconstructive inversion
of hierarchies relies. Second, stare decisis necessitates textual interpretation, which is accomplished by using the same inferential
techniques that deconstruction uses to establish the indeterminacy of texts. Third, because most legal problems may ultimately
be reduced to an opposition between the individual and society,
most legal arguments may ultimately be reduced to an effort to
manipulate that opposition, just as the critical legal studies movement has manipulated it in order to challenge the appeal of liberalism. 5 2 If the practice of law and the practice of deconstruction
coincide, mastering the techniques of deconstruction will improve
one's ability to practice law.
Both the process of evaluating a set of precedents in order to
ascertain the governing principle, and the process of applying the
governing principle to the facts of a specific case, involve functional analysis. This is especially true of contemporary legal analysis because of the realist substitution of functionalism for
formalism. Induction of the governing principle constitutes an
effort to ascertain what objective the legal system is trying to advance by the particular pattern of precedents that it has generated. Likewise, deducing the outcome of a specific case
constitutes an effort to ascertain what result will best serve the
objective that has been extracted from the precedents. As a result, legal analysis is acutely concerned with the relationship between legal principles and their functional justifications.
Deconstruction is also acutely concerned with that relationship.
Hierarchies are ungrounded and then inverted by tampering with
the putative connections that exist between principles and purposes. By highlighting the significance of those connections to
the acceptability of an argument, and by illustrating techniques
for the severance and reversal of those connections, the process
of deconstruction has pragmatic utility for the practice of law.
Moreover, the suggestion that a "dangerous supplement" is in52. Some disputes might not initially appear to involve conflicts between
the individual and society, such as disputes between private individuals, disputes

between an individual and a group, or disputes between groups. Consistent
with the tenets of liberalism, however, these disputes can be recast as conflicts
between the individual and society. Disputes between individuals necessarily en-

tail the intervention or non-intervention of society on behalf of the individual
disputants. In disputes between an individual and a group, the group is the
relevant society for purposes of liberal analysis. Similarly, disputes between
groups are of liberal interest only because of the effect that they will ultimately
have on the welfare of individual group members; concern for the welfare of

groups in and of themselves is a communitarian rather than a liberal endeavor.
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herent in all statements of principle provides an incentive for
practitioners to keep digging for favorable arguments no matter
how superficially appealing an adverse argument might initially
appear to be.
Textual analysis of common law precedents is an important
aspect of legal practice because the doctrine of stare decisis requires adherence to precedent. The deconstructive techniques
used to establish the "free play" of texts are also useful in formulating arguments that are the stuff of everyday textual interpretation. By exploiting the necessary distinction between authorial
intent and mere manifestations of intent, lawyers can uncover ambiguities in seemingly precise precedents and can formulate functional arguments for resolving those ambiguities in favor of their
clients' interests. In a contracts context, textual interpretation
has added utility because, not only precedents, but contracts
themselves must be interpreted. Moreover, it is frequently apparent that the parties have formulated no actual intent about how to
deal with a particular contingency, and the contractual manifestation of their intent is of little assistance in determining how to
resolve the case. Mastery of the techniques used to establish textual indeterminacy facilitates the formulation of strategies by
which courts and lawyers can deal with such problems.
The third way in which the critical legal studies movement
can improve one's ability to practice law is by providing one particular set of substantive arguments that can almost always be invoked, regardless of the particular legal issue in dispute. As part
of its campaign against liberal legalism, the critical legal studies
movement has focused attention on the hierarchical opposition
between the individual and society on which our liberal philosophical tradition rests. The inconsistency embedded within that
hierarchy is so basic that it is often referred to as the "fundamental contradiction." 5 3 The fundamental contradiction is that individuals can attain their individuality only through membership in
a society. 54 This creates an interdependence between the two
concepts that permits the individual/society opposition to be perpetually manipulated. 5 5 It also permits derivative manipulation of
the doctrines that the legal system generates in order to mediate
53. The phrase was coined by Duncan Kennedy in Kennedy, The Structure
of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 Buffalo L. Rev. 205, 211-13 (1979).
54. See id. at 211-13.
55. For example, although individual liberty occupies the favored position
in the liberal hierarchy, individual liberty can be secured only by ceding to the
society the power needed to override one individual's liberty in order to protect
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the fundamental contradiction. This is particularly true of contract doctrines, because the central problem of contract law is determining when judicial intervention is warranted in light of our
liberal preference for contractual autonomy. This is simply a special case of the fundamental contradiction. As a result, contracts
arguments can be developed for either side of an issue by linking
the desired outcome to the basic opposition between the individ56
ual and society.
One might argue that we knew all of these tricks before critical legal studies was ever invented. I suspect that for many of us
that is correct. But I also suspect that for many of us the critical
legal studies movement has systematized a technique for formulating legal arguments that we were not quite sure how to make
before we learned about deconstruction. Moreover, I suspect
that the critical legal studies movement has expanded our working conception ofjust how much doctrinal manipulation is realistically possible in the name of principled legal analysis.
Nevertheless, I do not believe that the enhancement of practice
techniques constitutes the major contribution that the critical
legal studies movement has made to the practice of law. Rather,
its major practical contribution lies in what I hope will constitute
an improved method for making legal decisions.
B. Atheoretical Justification
The unmistakable message of the critical legal studies movement is that doctrine does not account for the way in which the
legal system decides cases. This is true whether doctrine is construed narrowly to include only legal rules, or whether it is construed broadly to include principles of the social sciences, moral
the liberty of another. This, in turn, subordinates individual liberty to the superior power of society and gives society the favored position in the hierarchy.
56. For example, something as basic as a statute of frauds problem can be
reconceived as a problem that reflects the tension between the individual and
society, and the hierarchy that exists between the two can be manipulated in
order to support either result. One arguing in favor of the enforcement of oral
agreements would emphasize the evidence of actual agreement and argue in
favor of flexible application of the statute, with expansive construction of its exceptions, because such an interpretation would best serve the liberal objectives
of the legal system out of which the statute emerged. One arguing against enforcement would emphasize the need to provide incentives for parties to make
written contracts in order to promote certainty and stability over the range of
agreements, because such an interpretation would minimize judicial enforcement of non-agreements and best serve the liberal objectives of the legal system
out of which the statute emerged.
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philosophy or even astrology. Any principled explanation for a
particular outcome can be deconstructed-it can be shown not to
have actually generated the result attributed to it. Although such
assertions often instill anxieties about nihilism, these anxieties are
largely unwarranted. Nevertheless, the critical legal studies
movement has demonstrated that the prevailing model of our
legal decision making process is inadequate, and we are not justified in ignoring that demonstration. Rather, we should incorporate the central indeterminacy insight of critical legal studies into
the way in which we make our legal decisions.
The scope of the radical indeterminacy claim made by the
critical legal studies movement is vast. Radical indeterminacy denies the ability to give a principled explanation for the occurrence
of any social phenomenon. As a result, critical legal studies has
generated a fair amount of alarmist opposition based upon its allegedly nihilistic propensities. In my view, however, apprehensions about nihilism misconceive both the nature of the radical
indeterminacy claim and the nature of the legal system to which it
is directed. The critical legal studies movement grew out of dissatisfaction with a particular epistemological model that was
thought to govern legal analysis, and the indeterminacy claim
amounts to nothing more than an argument for why that should
not be taken as the governing model. Radical indeterminacy
would portend nihilism only if we were irrevocably committed to
the current model because it would then threaten the validity of
the only available means of understanding the world in which we
live. But we are not irrevocably committed to the current model.
There are alternatives, and the critical legal studies movement
suggests that it is now time to start exploring them.
The prevailing model of legal analysis is heavily rational. It
assumes that language effectively captures the concepts that it describes and that rules of logic govern the manner in which those
concepts interact. Critical legal studies suggests that both assumptions of the current model are incorrect. Language does not
reproduce concepts but merely approximates them, in the same
way that manifestations merely approximate intent. As a result,
the slippage that exists between an actual concept and its linguistic approximation can be exploited in the course of formulating
an argument. In addition, the rules of logic do not adequately
account for the ways in which concepts can interact. Logical analysis generates reliable conclusions only when the rules of logic
are applied to premises having ascertainable truth values-premises that are either true or false. The premises that we are forced
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to use in conducting our legal analyses, however, are indeterminate rather than true or false. Because every concept contains the
trace of its "dangerous supplement" the operative truth value of a
concept or premise depends upon the use to which it is to be put
in a particular logical argument. This can cause logical arguments to be self-referential and subtly circular. And it can allow
the formulation of arguments that seem counter-intuitive even
though they have no apparent analytical defects. 57
Deconstruction is accomplished by manipulating the ambiguities inherent in language and by performing logical operations
on premises that are not suitable for incorporation into logical
arguments. That is why deconstruction often seems artificial and
counter-intuitive. However, exploitation of the inadequacies in
language and logic characterizes all legal arguments, not just
those used to deconstruct doctrine. The reason that more traditional arguments do not seem equally artificial is simply because
they are more traditional. Because they have been around longer,
we have learned to vest them with intuitive appeal. It is not because they are better arguments. Because they are not. Critical
legal studies has demonstrated that whatever it is that distinguishes a good argument from a bad one operates through some
process other than syllogistic reasoning. The epistemological
model that actually accounts for how our legal decisions are made
is a non-rational one. Critical legal studies does not nihilistically
establish that there are no governing rules, but rather that the
governing rules are likely to be inarticulable ones. The implication of critical legal studies for legal theorists is that it is time to
start developing new models to account for the manner in which
legal and other rational decisions are made. My guess is that the
substitute model will turn out to be largely aesthetic. Nevertheless, the important implication of critical legal studies for legal
practice is more concrete.
Even though we no longer have a serviceable explanatory
model to account for the operation of our legal system, I think we
do know where the operative rules reside. The operative legal
rules, as opposed to the rules contained in the statutes and precedents, are comprised of a complex amalgam of conflicting cultural
norms. Because they are so complex, we could not begin to write
them down or even to understand their content. Nevertheless,
57. The analytical difficulties created by heavy reliance on language and
logic are explored more fully in Spann, Secret Rights, 71 Minn. L Rev. 669
(1987).
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the rules are accessible to us, operating through their embodiment in our social decision makers. Individuals who are socialized in a particular culture embody the most accurate
representation possible of that culture's operative rules. And
when those individuals make social decisions, they make them in
the way that the inarticulable rules of the culture require them to
be made. This is not to say that individual decision makers will
always agree about proper outcomes. In fact, controversial cases
must generate disagreement among decision makers in order to
reflect accurately the lack of societal consensus attendant to
proper resolution of the case. The fact that we have very little
cognitive understanding of what is going on is highly interesting,
but it is of purely academic interest. As a matter of practical consequence, things are proceeding apace.
What then is the important message of critical legal studies
for the practice of law? Grant Gilmore has suggested that there
58
may be an inverse relationship between law and social justice. I
believe that the reason for this is that legal doctrine can be very
distracting. If we take it too seriously, we run the risk of letting it
divert us from the path of correct decision making. The less law
there is, however, the less likely doctrine is to constitute such a
diversion. And the more likely we are to get things right. Speaking of the need for faithful application of the law, Judge Wyzanski
once wrote, "the never-to-be-forgotten caution is that this Court
is not free to render such decision as seems to it equitable, just
and in accordance with public policy .... 59 Judge Wyzanski did
not understand the practical lesson of critical legal studies, and he
allowed doctrine to stand in the way of his administration of
0
justice.6
CONCLUSION
The nineteenth century formalists suggested that law was a
science that could be understood through the inductive methodologies of the scientific method. The early twentieth century realists suggested that law was a social science that could be
understood through the pragmatic methodologies of the social
scientific method. Now, the late twentieth century critical legal
58. See text accompanying note 51 supra.
59. Pomerantz v. Clark, 101 F. Supp. 341, 345 (D. Mass. 1951).
60. For an example of how a case might be decided by a judge who does
understand the practical message of critical legal studies see Kennedy, Freedom
and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical Phenomenology, 36 J. Legal Educ.
518 (1986).
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studies movement has suggested that law is really nothing at all.
Rather, it is a mere conglomeration of deconstructable doctrines
that necessarily have no effect on the way that legal decisions are
made. Legal decisions are guided by the invisible hand of our
complex cultural values, operating through their embodiment in
our social decision makers. Nevertheless, by paying undue attention to doctrine we risk interference with proper decision making
through diversion of the invisible hand from its appointed course.
As a result, the most significant thing about legal doctrine is its
lack of significance.
If I am correct about the declining significance of doctrine,
we might expect the future to hold fewer and fewer doctrinal
rules. And the rules that do persist may show less and less concern for constraining the discretion of legal decision makers. In
fact, such an evolution may already be occurring. Consider, for
example, Article II of the Uniform Commercial Code and its infusion of reasonableness-type standards into nearly every sphere of
traditional contract concern. This trend has been replicated in
the Second Restatement of Contracts, and commentators have already begun to speculate about an expansion of the trend in some
61
future Third Restatement.
Nevertheless, you may sense an internal inconsistency in all
of this. I have suggested both that doctrine is largely irrelevant to
legal decision-making, and that undue attention to doctrine can
undermine the soundness of legal decision making by interfering
with the complex cultural norms that operate through their embodiment in our judges and other social decision-makers. If doctrine cannot control decision-making, how can a doctrinal
diversion cause a decision-maker to reach an improper result?
Either doctrine is relevant to legal decision-making or it is not,
but it cannot be both. If you think that you have caught me in a
contradiction, arguably you have. But it is not a contradiction
that matters very much. At least not under a post-critical legal
studies model of legal reasoning, where internal inconsistency is
the humdrum of everyday deconstruction.
61. See Knapp, The Promise of the Future--and Vice Versa: Some Reflections on the Metamorphosis of Contract Law (Book Review), 82 Mich. L Rev.
932 (1984)(reviewing E.A. Farnsworth, Contracts (1982)).
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